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Voir Dire: Questioning Prospective Jurors
on Their Willingness to Follow the Law
JAmms H. GOLD*
INTRODUCTION
A criminal defendant will often rely on legal principles which, though well
established, are not readily accepted by many members of the public. These
principles include the presumption of innocence, the right to have no adverse
inference drawn from a failure to testify, the availability of insanity as an
exculpatory defense, and the prohibition against considering prior criminal
convictions as evidence of guilt of the charged offense. After all the evidence
has been presented, a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on
these principles if they are pertinent to his case.' However, the jurors will
not be questioned at this stage of the trial as to their willingness to conduct
their deliberations in accordance with the judge's instructions. A defendant
has no guarantee that the jury will follow the law in reaching its general
2
verdict of acquittal or conviction.
During the pre-trial jury selection process known as voir dire, criminal
defendants often seek to question prospective jurors as to their willingness
and ability to follow specific rules of law.3 The defendant can then challenge
for cause or excuse peremptorily4 those prospective jurors whose responses
* Lecturer of Law, Indiana University; J.D. Wayne State University, 1979; B.A. Grinnell
College, 1972. The author was an. Assistant Appellate Defender for the North Carolina Office
of the Appellate Defender from 1980 to 1983.
1. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) (refusal to instruct on presumption of
innocence violated due process); United States v. Winn, 577 F.2d 86, 90 (9th Cir. 1978) (refusal
to instruct on insanity or mental defect not error where no evidence of either was presented).
2. See infra notes 86-88, 115-17 and accompanying text.
3. A typical example of such an inquiry is found in United States v. Wooton, 518 F.2d
943, 944 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 895 (1975):

If you, in your own individual judgment, came to the conclusion that the government had not proven beyond all reasonable doubt that at the time the defendant
committed the crimes in question he was sane and of sound mind, would you
have any scruples or difficulty bringing in a verdict of not guilty?
4. A prospective juror will be excused for cause based on a showing of "a narrowly
specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 220 (1965). On the other hand, a party may excuse a prospective juror peremptorily without
giving any reason for doing so. Id. While an unlimited number of jurors may be challenged
for cause, each side is allotted by statute or court rule only a finite number of peremptory
challenges. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECnON PROCEDURES 282-84 (1977), for a list of the

number of peremptories allowed in each jurisdiction. A venireman's acknowledged unwillingness
to follow an applicable rule of law would present grounds for a successful challenge for cause.
See, e.g., State v. Leonard, 296 N.C. 58, 248 S.E.2d 853 (1978). However, a venireman who
expressed disagreement with a legal rule, but was willing to adhere to it, probably could only
be excused through the use of a peremptory challenge. See, e.g., Brazelton v. State, 550 S.W.2d
7 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974).
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indicate a bias against the law. Many courts, however, will not allow questions pertaining to rules of law.5 It is often claimed that such questions are
improperly used to indoctrinate the jurors. Another reason advanced for
excluding this method of voir dire is that the questions are too time consuming and are unnecessary when the same subject matter is covered in the
judge's final instructions to the jury. However, there is by no means a
consensus against voir dire questions concerning rules of law. Several courts
have held that in order to assure a criminal defendant's right to an impartial
jury reasonable questions should be permitted concerning a prospective ju6
ror's willingness to apply relevant doctrines of law.
This article analyzes the decisions addressing this issue, and critically
examines the reasons offered for prohibiting voir dire questions on rules of
law. It concludes that these reasons do not justify blanket prohibition of
this form of voir dire inquiry. Further, courts often are inconsistent in their
treatment of voir dire questions on rules of law. Decisions regarding their
allowance often seem to depend not on the prejudicial effects of the question,
but rather on whether it is the prosecution or the defendant seeking the
inquiry. Therefore, limits should be placed on the broad discretion traditionally accorded the trial judge in deciding whether to allow a proposed
voir dire inquiry. This article proposes that defendants be granted a per se
right to ask prospective jurors if they are willing to follow the judge's
instructions on specific legal doctrines, and that the trial judge's discretion
be limited to deciding whether more detailed, open-ended questioning beyond
the minimally required inquiry is necessary to expose possible bias against
a rule of law. On appellate review, the trial judge's decision regarding the
scope of voir dire examination should constitute an abuse of discretion if
the allowed inquiry failed to provide the defendant with a reasonable assurance that any prejudice against the law could be discovered.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The practice of questioning potential jurors in order to discover bias has
its origins in the United States. In 18th-century England, a juror called to
sit in a criminal case could be challenged only for a specific bias, such as
a family or economic relationship with one of the litigants. 7 Challenges or

5. In refusing to allow a proposed inquiry, courts will often cite rules such as "voir dire
questions concerning legal principles [are] improper," Commonwealth v. Kingsley, 480 Pa. 560,

391 A.2d 1027, 1033 (1978), or "[t]he defense [is] not entitled to ask whether the jury would
be able to follow the instructions of the trial court." Head v. State, 160 Ga. App. 4, 285

S.E.2d 735, 739 (1981).
6. People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317, 628 P.2d 869 (1981); Griffin
v. State, 239 Ark. 431, 389 S.W.2d 900 (1965); Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 823, 826 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1974). See also cases cited infra note 31.
7.

J. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 141.
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inquiries concerning a general prejudice against the defendant's class, race
or religion were not permitted." Further, under the English practice, a potential juror could be questioned as to possible bias only after he had been
challenged on specific grounds. 9
Following the Revolution, courts in this country greatly expanded the right
of litigants to have jurors questioned and excused for prejudice.' 0 This
expansion has been attributed to the greater mobility and heterogeneity of
the population, the vastness of the frontier, and the growing anonymity of
the urban citizen, all of which made it more difficult for parties to obtain
information about jurors prior to trial." It has also been suggested that
political trials in the colonial era, in which the fate of dissidents was often
decided by juries composed of those sympathetic to the Crown, created a
2
hostility in this country to restrictive jury selection practices.'
In the treason trial of Aaron Burr in 1807, Chief Justice John Marshall,
sitting as trial judge, allowed defense counsel an extensive voir dire of
potential jurors, holding that an individual who has formed a "strong and
deep" opinion on any significant issue in the case could not be considered
an impartial juror.' 3 The Burr case was widely cited in the 19th century by
state courts authorizing voir dire inquiries into possible prejudice.' 4 Today,
prosecutors and criminal defendants can challenge prospective jurors, for
cause and peremptorily, in every jurisdiction in the country.' 5 In order to
facilitate the intelligent exercise of challenges, each jurisdiction also provides
for some form of questioning
of prospective jurors by either the attorneys,
6
the judge, or both.'
As the voir dire examination developed and questioning became more
expansive, critics began pointing to perceived abuses of the system, including
the asking of questions relating to rules of law.' 7 During the first quarter
of this century, courts began holding that voir dire questions relating to

8.
9.
10.

Id.
Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors, 17 Gao. L.J. 13, 35-36 (1928).
Id. at 36.

11. Id.
12. Gutman, The Attorney Conducted Voir Dire of Jurors: A ConstitutionalRight, 39
BROOKLYN L. REv. 290, 294-95 (1972).
13. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g).
14. Gutman, supra note 12, at 307 n.54.
15. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. Rv. 545, 55051(1975).
16. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 282-84.
17. In 1915, one commentator wrote that "[q]uestions intending to test the juror's bias
and relating to his understanding of the weight of the evidence, the burden of proof, the
presumption of innocence, and the like, are asked again and again of men unlearned in law
.... " Perkins, Some Needed Reforms in the Methods of Selecting Juries, 13 MICH. L. Rav.
391, 396 (1915). See also Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 277
U.S. 590 (1928), in which Judge Learned Hand stated that "It]he length and particularity of
the examination of jurors had become a scandal, and required some effective control."
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specific legal issues were improper.' 8 In 1933, one writer described the state
of the law as follows: "It generally is held proper to exclude questions as
to the juror's knowledge of, or attitude toward, the law applicable, on the
theory that such questions involve matters of law to be dealt with by the
court in its instructions to the jury, which instructions the jurors are bound
to follow."' 9 However, some courts during this period maintained the view
that defendants had a right to probe the prospective jurors' willingness to
follow specific rules of law. 20 This split of authority has continued to the

present day.
CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW

The rule prohibiting questions on legal principles during voir dire is still
widely, but not uniformly, followed. Appellate courts have held that defendants have no right to inquire into a potential juror's acceptance of: the
state's burden of proof and the defendant's presumption of innocence, 2' the
defendant's right to have no adverse inference drawn from his failure to
18.

See, e.g., Richards v. United States, 175 F. 911 (8th Cir. 1909), cert. denied, 218

U.S. 670 (1910); Brown v. State, 40 Fla. 459, 25 So. 63 (1898); Lindsay v. State, 138 Ga. 818,
76 S.E. 369 (1912); State v. Hoagland, 39 Idaho 405, 228 P. 314 (1924); State v. Perioux, 107
La. 601, 31 So. 1016 (1902); State v. Douthitt, 26 N.M. 532, 194 P. 879 (1921); People v.
Conklin, 175 N.Y. 333, 67 N.E. 624 (1903); Jones v. State, 20 Okla. Crim. 154, 201 P. 664
(1921); Commonwealth v. Calhoun, 238 Pa. 474, 86 A. 472 (1913); State v. Turley, 87 Vt.
163, 88 A. 562 (1913); State v. Duncan, 124 Wash. 372, 214 P. 838 (1923); Ryan v. State, 115
Wis. 488, 92 N.W. 271 (1902).
One impetus for these decisions may have been the abolition of the jury's right to decide
questions of law. This right, which was generally recognized in the first half of the 19th century,
underwent a gradual decline in the second half, culminating in the Supreme Court's holding
in Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895), that it was the jury's duty to apply the law as

given to it by the judge. See generally Note, The ChangingRole of the Jury in the Nineteenth
Century, 74 YALE L.J. 170 (1964). Courts subsequently held that voir dire questions exploring
a prospective juror's knowledge or opinion of specific points of law were irrelevant because
the juror was bound to take the law from the court. See, e.g., State v. Willie, 130 La. 454,
58 So. 147 (1912); People v. Conklin, 175 N.Y. 333, 67 N.E. 624 (1903). Courts soon expanded
this rationale to hold that questions directed to a prospective juror's willingness to follow the
law were also irrelevant because of the juror's obligation to decide the case in accordance with
the judge's instructions. See, e.g., State v. Hoagland, 39 Idaho 405, 228 P. 314 (1924); State
v. Douthitt, 26 N.M. 532, 194 P. 879 (1921).
19. Note, Examination of Prospective Jurors on Voir Dire, 17 MINN. L. Rav. 299, 308
(1933).
20. See, e.g., People v. Bennett, 79 Cal. App. 76, 249 P. 20 (1926); People v. Redola,
300 Ill. 392, 133 N.E. 292 (1921); Hibbitt v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 527, 236 S.W. 739 (1922).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1068 (1979); United States v. Ledee, 549 F.2d 990 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977);
United States v. Wooton, 518 F.2d 943 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 895 (1975); Cordero
v. United States, 456 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1983); Price v. State, 295 So. 2d 338 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1974); High v. State, 247 Ga. 289, 276 S.E.2d 5 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 927 (1982);
Smith v. State, 238 Ga. 146, 231 S.E.2d 757 (1977); State v. Bitz, 93 Idaho 239, 460 P.2d 374
(1969); People v. Lowe, 30 Ill. App. 3d 49, 331 N.E.2d 639 (1975); Commonwealth v. Rhoades,
379 Mass. 810, 401 N.E.2d 342 (1980); Manning v. State, 630 P.2d 327 (Okla. Crim. App.
1981); State v. Middleton, 266 S.C. 251, 222 S.E.2d 763, vacated on other grounds, 429 U.S.
807 (1976).
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testify, 22 the defenses of insanity and intoxication, 23 the rule limiting consideration of a defendant's prior convictions to the question of his credibility, 24 the entrapment defense,2 the coercion defense, 26 the doctrines of
self-defense and defense of another, 27 the requirement of proof of penetration
in a rape prosecution, 28 and the requirement of proof of premeditation in
a first degree murder charge. 29 Other courts, without specifically describing
the questions sought to be asked on voir dire, have stated generally that it
is proper to prohibit questions concerning legal principles. 0 On the other
hand, several appellate courts have found grounds for reversal in the refusal
to allow questions on the jury's willingness to follow the same legal principles
noted above."
22. See, e.g., United States v. Ledee, 549 F.2d 990 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902
(1977); United States v. Jordano, 521 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Cowles, 503
F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975); United States v. Goodwin, 470
F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969 (1973); Roberson v. State, 384 So. 2d 864
(Ala. Crim. App. 1980); Dutton v. State, 452 A.2d 127 (Del. 1982); Jacobs v. State, 358 A.2d
725 (Del. 1976); Anderson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 816, 289 S.E.2d 22 (1982); Freeman v. State,
132 Ga. App. 615, 208 S.E.2d 625 (1974); State v. Bitz, 93 Idaho 239, 460 P.2d 374 (1969);
People v. Newlun, 89 Il. App. 3d 938, 412 N.E.2d 1055 (1980); Commonwealth v. Fiore, 9
Mass. App. Ct. 618, 403 N.E.2d 953, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 938 (1980); People v. Lambo, 8
Mich. App. 320, 154 N.W.2d 583 (1967); Commonwealth v. Kingsley, 480 Pa. 560, 391 A.2d
1027 (1978); Commonwealth v. Richmond, 462 A.2d 1362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Flint, 534 F.2d 58 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924
(1976); United States v. Wooton, 518 F.2d 943 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 895 (1975);
Fletcher v. State, 291 Ala. 67, 277 So. 2d 882 (1973); Padgett v. State, 251 Ga. 503, 307 S.E.2d
480 (1983); Wallace v. State, 248 Ga. 255, 282 S.E.2d 325 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 927
(1982); Commonwealth v. Estremera, 383 Mass. 382, 419 N.E.2d 835 (1981); Commonwealth
v. Killelea, 370 Mass. 638, 351 N.E.2d 509 (1976); Commonwealth v. Smith, 357 Mass. 168,
258 N.E.2d 13 (1970); State v. Dunbar, 117 N.H. 904, 379 A.2d 831 (1977); State v. Kelly,
118 N.J. Super. 38, 285 A.2d 571 (1972); Commonwealth v. Biebighauser, 450 Pa. 336, 300
A.2d 70 (1973). Commonwealth v. Geschwendt, 271 Pa. Super. 102, 412 A.2d 595 (1979),
aff'd, 500 Pa. 120, 454 A.2d 991 (1982).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Polk, 550 F.2d 1265 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
838 (1977); United States v. Brewer, 427 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1970); Gandy v. State, 49 Ala.
App. 123, 269 So. 2d 141 (1972); State v. Schad, 129 Ariz. 557, 633 P.2d 366 (1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 983 (1982); State v. Melendez, 121 Ariz. 1, 588 P.2d 294 (1978); Tuckson v.
United States, 364 A.2d 138 (D.C. 1976); State v. Simms, 643 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982);
State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 255 A.2d 193 (1969).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, 444 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 855 (1971); Sprague v. State, 147 Ga. App. 347, 248 S.E.2d 711 (1978); State v. Talbot,
135 N.J. Super. 500, 343 A.2d 777 (1975), aff'd, 71 N.J. 160, 364 A.2d 9 (1976).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 722 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1983); People v. Phillips, 99
Ill. App. 3d 362, 425 N.E.2d 1040 (1981).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Johnson v. State,
244 Ga. 295, 260 S.E.2d 23 (1979); People v. Bradley, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1100, 424 N.E.2d 33
(1981); Palmer v. State, 532 P.2d 85 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
28. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 315 A.2d 157 (D.C. 1974).
29. See, e.g., State v. Knapp, 534 S.W.2d 465 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
30. United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1974); People v. Horrocks, 190 Colo.
501, 549 P.2d 400 (1976); State v. Clark, 164 Conn. 224, 319 A.2d 398 (1973); Oliver v. State,
85 Nev. 418, 456 P.2d 431 (1969); Nease v. State, 592 S.W.2d 327 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979).
31. Burden of proof and presumption of innocence: see, e.g., Blount v. United States,
479 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1973); Jones v. State, 378 So. 2d 797 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State
v. Monroe, 329 So. 2d 193 (La. 1976).
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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SCOPE OF VOIR DIRE

The United States Supreme Court has recognized the importance of an
adequate voir dire in securing a criminal defendant's constitutional right to
an impartial jury. 32 Recently the Court stated the following:
Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant
that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored.
Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge's responsibility to remove
prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court's
instructionsand evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled. Similarly, lack
of adequate voir dire impairs the defendant's right to exercise peremptory
challenges where provided by statute or rule, as it is in the federal courts.,,

Despite this broad language, the Court's decisions do not portend that a
constitutional right to question prospective jurors on their willingness to
follow applicable rules of law will be established in the near future.

Defendant's right to have no adverse inference drawn from his failure to testify: see, e.g.,
People v. Zehr, 110 I11.App. 3d 458, 442 N.E.2d 581 (1982); State v. Frith, 412 So. 2d 1000
(La. 1982); State v. Beatty, 617 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
Insanity defense: see, e.g., United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1977); Fauna v.
State, 265 Ark. 934, 582 S.W.2d 18 (1979); Washington v. State, 371 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979); People v. Moore, 6 Ill. App. 3d 568, 286 N.E.2d 6 (1972); State v. Olson,
156 Mont. 339, 480 P.2d 822 (1971).
Rule limiting consideration of a defendant's prior convictions: see, e.g., State v. Hedgepeth,
66 N.C. App. 390, 310 S.E.2d 920 (1984); State v. Ziebert, 34 Or. App. 497, 579 P.2d 275
(1978).
Self-defense: see, e.g., People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal. Rptr.
317 (1981); Everly v. State, 271 Ind. 687, 395 N.E.2d 254 (1979); State v. Brown, 547 S.W.2d
797 (Mo. 1977).
Note that splits of authority appear within the court systems of Florida and Illinois and
that voir dire questions are required on some issues, but not others, in Missouri and the Ninth
Circuit.
32. This right is set forth in the sixth amendment which states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
.
... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (plurality opinion of White,
J.) (emphasis added and citations omitted). The plurality opinion containing this language was
signed by only four members of the Court, but dissenting Justices Stevens, Brennan, and
Marshall advocated a position even more pro-defendant, so they clearly would also endorse
the quoted portion of the plurality opinion. See also Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396,
408 (1894), in which the Court, in a unamimous opinion, refers to the right to challenge as
"one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused" and states that "[a]ny system
for the empanelling of a jury that prevents or embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise by
the accused of that right, must be condemned."
The Court, however, has never explicitly held that any voir dire examination is constitutionally mandated. For instance, in Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973), the
Court stated that South Carolina law "permits" challenges for cause, and "authorizes" a voir
dire examination. However, it is generally agreed that the Court would strike down on sixth
amendment grounds any legislation which prevented a defendant from challenging jurors for
cause. Orfield, Trial Jurorsin FederalCriminal Cases, 29 F.R.D. 43, 75 (1961). The question
of whether a defendant has a constitutional right to exercise peremptory challenges is discussed
in Babcock, supra note 15, at 555-57.
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The Supreme Court's recent decisions defining the scope of the voir dire
examination have involved inquiries into possible prejudice against classes4
of people, rather than against rules of law. In Ham v. South Carolina,1
the Court held that Ham, a black, bearded civil rights activist on trial for
a drug offense, had a constitutional right under the due process clause to
a voir dire inquiry into possible racial prejudice. However, the Court also
held that Ham had no constitutional right to have the veniremen questioned
concerning possible prejudice against men with beards, even though the Court
acknowledged the possibility that one or more of the jurors harbored such
a bias. 35 The only justification offered for this latter ruling was the trial
judge's traditionally broad discretion in conducting voir dire and the Supreme
Court's "inability to constitutionally distinguish possible prejudice against
beards from a host of other possible similar prejudices .... "36
In Ristaino v. Ross, 37 the Court interpreted Ham narrowly and held that
a voir dire inquiry into racial prejudice in a robbery and assault case was
not constitutionally required merely because the defendant was black and
the victim white. In distinguishing Ham, the Court emphasized Ham's defense that he had been framed because of his civil rights activities. The
Court reasoned that this defense directly injected racial issues into the trial
and created a "constitutionally significant likelihood" 38 that an impartial
jury would not be impaneled absent questioning about racial prejudice. The
mere fact that the defendant and victim in Ross were of different races was
held not to create such a likelihood.
The Burger Court has declined opportunities to consider whether a defendant was entitled to have veniremen questioned on their willingness to
follow a specific rule of law. 39 A defendant raising this issue on constitutional
grounds would face a formidable task. He would have to convince the Court
that there is a greater likelihood of jury prejudice against a rule of law such
as the insanity defense 4° than against a black defendant charged with assaulting a white victim or a bearded defendant on trial for a drug offense
in 1970. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Ham suggests that the Court
will be less willing to find an unconstitutional restriction of a voir dire
4
examination when the prohibited question does not concern racial bias. '

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

409 U.S. 524 (1973).
Id. at 527-28.
Id. at 528.
424 U.S. 589 (1976).
Id. at 596.

39. United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1068
(1979); United States v. Wooton, 518 F.2d 943 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 895 (1975).
40. A defendant arguing that he had a constitutional right to question prospective jurors
on their willingness to follow the law on the insanity defense would likely cite polls illustrating
the public's disapproval of that defense. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.

41.

In holding that Ham had a right under the fourteenth amendment to a voir dire

inquiry into racial prejudice, Justice Rehnquist's opinion emphasized that a primary purpose
behind the adoption of that amendment "was to prohibit the States from invidiously discrim-
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Furthermore, in Ross the Court stated that an inquiry into a particular

prejudice feared by a defendant will generally not be necessary to satisfy
the state's constitutional obligation to impanel an impartial jury. 42 Thus, the

Court would appear to have little inclination to recognize a constitutional
right to voir dire inquiry into prejudice against a rule of law.

The Court in Ross provided some encouragement for those raising voir
dire issues on other than federal constitutional grounds by noting that any
43
state is free to require questions not demanded by the Federal Constitution.
The Ross Court also declared that "the wiser course generally is to propound
appropriate questions designed to identify racial prejudice if requested by
the defendant. '" 44 The Court went on to state that, under its supervisory
powers over federal courts, it would have required a voir dire inquiry into
racial prejudice had Ross been tried in a federal court, instead of a state
court.4 Thus, Ham and Ross merely establish outer limits with respect to
a defendant's voir dire rights under the Federal Constitution. They do not
constitute a barrier to those pursuing voir dire issues on other than federal
constitutional grounds.
TBE CONCERN THAT QUESTIONS ON RULES OF LAW INDOCTRINATE JURORS

A frequent justification offered for the prohibition of voir dire questions
on rules of law is that such questions are used to indoctrinate jurors and
commit them to a certain point of view before they have heard the evidence
and the judge's instructions. For instance, the New Jersey Supreme Court
has stated:
The impression is inescapable that the aim of counsel is no longer the
exclusion of unfit or partial or biased jurors. It has become the selection
of a jury as favorable to the party's point of view as indoctrination
through the medium of questions on assumed facts and rules of law can
accomplish.

inating on the basis of race .
409 U.S. at 526-27. The opinion made no mention of a
defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury. The Ham Court made no attempt to
justify the refusal to find a constitutional right to inquire into a prejudice against beards by
claiming that such a prejudice was substantially less prevalent than racial prejudice. Indeed,
such an argument would have been difficult to make, given the social climate in 1970, the year
of Ham's trial. Instead, the Court appeared to rely on the fact that prejudice against beards
was not a concern behind the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 528. As Justice
Marshall pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the Court had never previously suggested that
the right to an impartial jury only provided protection against racial prejudice. Id. at 531-32
(Marshall, J., dissenting). For a detailed analysis of Ham, see Gaba, Voir Dire of Jurors:
Constitutional Limits to the Right of Inquiry into Prejudice, 48 U. CoLo. L. Rav. 525 (1977).
42. Ross, 424 U.S. at 595.
43. Id. at 597 n.9.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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. . . Under the guise of eliciting information they attempt to impart to
the jurors a conception of the law highly favorable to one side of the
case. 46

But not all questions touching upon legal principles are improperly indoctrinating. Those questions which are improper can easily be controlled by
the trial judge without resort to the Draconian remedy of completely elim-

inating voir dire questions on rules of law.
It should be a legitimate function of voir dire for a defendant to question
veniremen on their willingness to follow specific rules of law because a juror
who cannot decide the case according to the law is not an impartial juror. 47
Virtually every state has rejected the notion that the jury has the right (as

distinguished from the power) to nullify the law by disregarding it in a
specific case. 48 Even proponents of jury nullification would not allow the
jury to reject a law protecting the rights of a criminal defendant. 49 Because

it is a juror's duty to follow the relevant rules of law, there should be
nothing improper about examining each juror's commitment to those rules.

Yet, courts continue to prohibit voir dire questions merely because they seek
such a commitment.
In Anderson v. State5 0 the defense proposed asking prospective jurors
whether they would expect the defendant to testify even if the judge instructed

them that the defendant had a constitutional right not to. The Georgia Court
of Appeals upheld the trial court's refusal to allow this question on the
grounds that it "sought to have the jurors prejudge how they might view

the defendant's failure to testify.' ' 5 However, the jury is without discretion
as to how it is to consider a defendant's failure to testify. Upon request, a
defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed that no adverse inference
is to be drawn from his failure to testify.52 Therefore, it is eminently reasonable to commit jurors to follow the law with respect to this issue.
46. State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 281, 285 n.la, 255 A.2d 193, 205, 207 n.IA (1969),
quoted with approval in People v. Saiz, 660 P.2d 2, 4 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982). See also State
v. Melendez, 121 Ariz. 1, 3, 588 P.2d 294, 296 (1978); State v. Clark, 164 Conn. 224, 226,
319 A.2d 398, 399 (1973); Jacobs v. State, 358 A.2d 725, 728 (Del. 1976); Anderson v. State,
161 Ga. App. 816, 816, 289 S.E.2d 22, 22 (1982); People v. Phillips, 99 Ill. App. 3d 362, 369,

425 N.E.2d 1040, 1046 (1981). See generally Note, The CaliforniaSupreme Court Permits Voir
Dire to be Conducted to Uncover a Basis for Peremptory Challenges-People v. Williams, 4
WHTTIER L. REv. 169, 181-189 (1982), in which the author argues that questions about the

veniremen's willingness to follow particular legal doctrines should not be allowed because of
their tendency to indoctrinate the jury.
47. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 596-97 (1978); Morgan v. People, 624 P.2d 1331,
1332 (Colo. 1981); Clarke v. Grimes, 223 Ga. 461, 462, 156 S.E.2d 91, 93 (1967); State v.
Rowe, 210 Neb. 419, 427, 315 N.W.2d 250, 256 (1982).
48. The only exceptions are Maryland and Indiana. Becker, Jury Nullification: Can a
Jury be Trusted?, 16 TRiAL, Oct. 1980 at 41, 44.

49. Christie, Lawful Departuresfrom Legal Rules: "Jury Nullification" and Legitimized
Disobedience, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1289, 1299 (1974).
50. 161 Ga. App. 816, 289 S.E.2d 22 (1982).
51. Id. at 816, 289 S.E.2d at 22.
52. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981); Woodard v. State, 234 Ga. 901, 218 S.E.2d

629 (1975).
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Similarly, in State v. Melendez,5 3 the trial judge refused to ask voir dire
questions concerning how the jury would consider the defendant's prior
felony conviction. In upholding the refusal, the Arizona Supreme Court

condemned the practice of "conditioning" the jury on voir dire by means
of questions which amount to preliminary instructions. It held that the

defendant's proposed questions seemed "designed to condition the jurors to
damaging evidence expected to be presented at trial and to commit them to

certain positions prior to receiving the evidence." '5 4 In Arizona, when a
defendant's prior convictions are admitted into evidence, the defendant is
entitled to have the jury instructed as to the limited purposes for which such

evidence can be considered.5 5 Again, it is a legitimate goal of voir dire to
commit jurors to adhere to a rule of law which will later be embodied in
the judge's charge to the jury. As a practical matter, such a commitment

56
can only be obtained during the voir dire.
It has also been argued that voir dire questions on matters of law are

indoctrinating because they overemphasize certain legal principles.5 7 Although
such emphasis cannot be totally avoided, it is not improper. A properly

phrased question merely asks jurors to commit themselves to follow a rule
of law which will later be covered in the judge's instructions. In view of
the evidence that juries frequently have difficulty understanding the judge's
final instructions,58 acquainting the potential jurors with the relevant rules
of law during voir dire would seem to be more, not less, conducive to a
fair trial. Further, the judge can limit the emphasis placed on any rule of
law by directing the attorney to ask the prospective jurors once as a group

about their willingness to follow a specific rule of law, instead of repeating
the query to each venireman.5 9 A reasonably phrased question about a
53. 121 Ariz. 1, 588 P.2d 294 (1978).
54. Id. at 3, 588 P.2d at 296.
55. State v. Finley, 85 Ariz. 327, 338 P.2d 790 (1959).
56. It would be impractical to attempt to examine jurors for bias after the evidence had
been presented because of the difficulty in distinguishing between a jqror who was biased
against the law and one who had not been persuaded by the evidence. Such a procedure would
also require that an inordinate number of alternate jurors be seated.
57. State v. Churchill, 664 P.2d 757, 761 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1983).
58. See Severance & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurorsto Comprehend and Apply
CriminalJury Instructions, 17 LAW & Soc. REV. 153 (1982); O'Mara & Eckartsberg, Proposed
9StandardJury Instructions-Evaluationof Usage and Understanding,48 PA. B.A.Q. 542 (1977);
Moffat, As Jurors See a Lawsuit, 24 OR. L. REv. 199 (1945). One experiment conducted on
a group of veniremen showed that only 50% understood that the defendant did not have to
present any evidence of his innocence even though they had just viewed a videotape of a pattern
jury instruction for a criminal case covering that point. Strawn & Buchanan, Jury Confusion:
A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478 (1976). The authors hypothesized that jury comprehension would be enhanced by giving as many of the instructions as .possible at the beginning
of the case so that jurors would know what to look for. Id. at 483. An expansive opening
jury charge was also recommended in Note, Jury Instructions v. Jury Charges, 82 W. VA. L.
REV. 555, 563-64 (1980).
59. In order to encourage venireman self-disclosure, each prospective juror should be
required to individually respond to any voir dire question addressed to the group. See infra
notes 113-14.
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potential juror's willingness to apply a particular doctrine of law should not
be excluded merely because it stresses certain laws or facts.60 Such emphasis
is an "unavoidable consequence of the voir dire" if the examination is to
serve its function of exposing jury bias against the law. 6 '
One court has stated that voir dire questions on legal rules are improperly
indoctrinating when they "forewarn the jury of unfavorable facts concerning
defendant," such as a prior criminal record.6 2 This contention is also without
merit. Evidence should be damaging because of its substance and not because
of the timing of its introduction. For instance, courts have rejected the
argument that it is impermissible for a party to attempt to reduce the
prejudicial effect of anticipated impeachment by asking his own witness on
direct examination about his criminal record.6 3 Similarly, an otherwise
legitimate voir dire question should not be disallowed merely because it alerts
the jurors to damaging evidence.
Those voir dire questions concerning matters of law which do constitute
improper efforts to indoctrinate or' mislead prospective jurors can easily be
controlled by the trial judge. One way an attorney can abuse the voir dire
process is to pose questions which slant or misstate the law.64 However, such
questions can be eliminated simply by requiring the attorney to submit his
questions to the judge prior to the examination of the jurors.65 The judge
can then direct the attorney to rewrite or discard those questions which are
not accurate statements of the law. The judge's task during voir dire would
be similar to that performed at the conclusion of the trial when he decides
whether to give requested jury instructions. With the advent of pattern jury

60. United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1973); People v. Williams, 29 Cal.
3d 392, 407-08, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317, 324-25, 628 P.2d 869, 877-78 (1981).
61. United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650, 652 (6th Cir. 1973).
62. State v. Schad, 129 Ariz. 557, 567-68, 633 P.2d 366, 377 (1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 983 (1982).
63. State v. Fleming, 117 Ariz. 122, 571 P.2d 268 (1977); People v. DeHoyos, 64 II1. 2d
128, 355 N.E.2d 19 (1976); Commonwealth v. Cadwell, 374 Mass. 308, 372 N.E.2d 246 (1978);
State v. Hedgepeth, 66 N.C. App. 390, 310 S.E.2d 920 (1984); State v. Gilbert, 282 Or. 309,
577 P.2d 939 (1978).
64. The Historical and Practice Notes to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 234, which prohibits
voir dire questions concerning matters of law or instructions, contain the following language:
The examination of jurors concerning questions of law supposed to be encountered
in the case is without question one of the most pernicious practices indulged in
by many attorneys. The usual procedure is to inquire as to whether or not jurors
will follow certain instructions if given. That the supposed instructions as orally
expounded by the advocate are slanted, argumentative and often so clearly erroneous as to cause certain reversal if given by the court, surprisingly appears to
be a matter of little concern.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. IlOA §234, (Smith-Hurd 1968), quoted with approval in State v. Manley,
54 N.J. 259, 278, 255 A.2d 193, 204 (1969).
65. The mechanism for such a procedure is already in effect in the many jurisdictions in
which it is the judge who questions the prospective jurors on voir dire, with the attorneys
merely submitting proposed questions. Those jurisdictions in which the judge conducts voir
dire are listed in J. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 282-84.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:163

instructions, 66 it should be relatively easy for both judges and attorneys to
formulate voir dire questions embodying correct statements of the law.
Voir dire inquiries are also improper when they seek to disclose the
prospective jurors' reaction to specific evidence to be presented at trial,
rather than to an applicable rule of law. A defendant is not entitled to
"obtain a pre-judgment by the prospective juror as to what his verdict would
be on facts hypothesized by the question." 67 While the jury is required to
follow the law as given by the trial judge, it is the jury's function to apply
8
that law to the facts which it finds from the evidence presented.
As with questions which misstate the law, voir dire inquiries which improperly require the veniremen to prejudge specific evidence can be controlled
by the trial judge. For instance, in State v. Rancourt,69 a self-defense case,
the defense attorney during voir dire sought to describe in detail the defendant's version of the events leading up to the shooting and then ask

66. Standardized pattern jury instructions are available in over 40 states, the District of
Columbia, and the federal courts, and it is expected that the remaining states will fall in line
in the next few years. A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. ALINI, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE 8 (1982). Although the first pattern instructions were published in California in

1938, most states have adopted pattern instructions within the last twenty-five years. Nieland,
Assessing the Impact of Pattern Jury Instructions, 62 JUDICATURE 185 (1978). Prior to the
adoption of pattern instructions, each party would submit his own requests for instructions
and the judge would decide which ones to give. A. ELWORK, B. SALES & J. ALxFINi, supra, at
7. The requested instructions were often confusing and argumentative. One book contained
fifty different charges on burden of proof which could be requested. Hannah, Jury Instructions:
An Appraisal by a Trial Judge, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 627, 635-36. Before pattern instructions were
adopted, it was difficult to prevent attorneys from abusing the voir dire process by committing
jurors to argumentative statements of the law. Judges can now require voir dire questions on
rules of law to conform to the language of the pattern instructions.
67. State v. Abney, 347 So. 2d 498, 501 (La. 1977). See also People v. Williams, 29 Cal.
3d 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1981); State v. Crockett, 419 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1967);
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 452 Pa. 130, 305 A.2d 5 (1973). The reasoning behind the rule
(which is followed equally by jurisdictions which do and do not allow questions as to a
venireman's willingness to follow specific legal principles) is that attorneys should not try their
cases during the voir dire examination. See generally Everly v. State, 271 Ind. 687, 395 N.E.2d
254 (1979). For example, a defendant should be able to ask veniremen whether they would
follow the law entitling him to an acquittal if the evidence showed that he acted in self-defense,
but not whether they believe that specific evidence would show that the defendant did, in fact,
act in self-defense.

68. United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972). Because it is for the jury to
decide which witnesses to believe, a voir dire examination directed towards the prospective
juror's assessment of witness credibility is of debatable propriety. A number of courts, including
some which consider voir dire questions concerning legal principles to be improper, have held
that a defendant has a right to ask prospective jurors whether they would give more weight
to the testimony of a law enforcement officer merely because of his official status. See Annot.,
28 A.L.R. FED. 26, 103-07 (1976); Annot., 99 A.L.R.2D 7, 71-72 (1965). Whether such an
inquiry constitutes a legitimate search for attitudes which would be grounds for disqualification
for cause, Commonwealth v. Futch, 469 Pa. 422, 366 A.2d 246 (1976), or is merely an invasion
of the province of the jury to determine credibility, Bennett v. State, 153 Ga. App. 21, 264
S.E.2d 516 (1980), is beyond the scope of this article. The questions examined here are those
probing the prospective jurors' willingness to apply rules of law which they are legally bound
to follow.

69.

435 A.2d 1095 (Me. 1981).
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whether, under the described circumstances, the jurors could find the defendant not guilty under the theory of self-defense. Such an inquiry was
deemed improper because it tended to commit the jury to a certain view of
the evidence before it was presented at trial. 70 However, the defect in the
inquiry could easily have been remedied. If the defense attorney had recited
the law of self-defense, without reference to the specific evidence of the
case, and then asked whether the jurors were willing to adhere to those
principles if so instructed by the judge, the defendant would have been able
to impanel jurors committed to following the law without having committed
7
them to a particular view of the evidence1.
Again, the widespread availability
of pattern jury instructions makes it relatively easy to formulate queries
which do not require the juror to prejudge the specific evidence to be
presented at trial.
Thus, the prohibition of voir dire questions relating to legal issues is not
justified by the argument that such questions improperly indoctrinate the
jury. That argument fails to recognize that not all questions as to matters
of law are improper, and it fails to recognize the capacity of the trial judge
to restrain improper efforts to indoctrinate or commit the jury.
THE CONCERN THAT LEGAL ISSUES EXPLORED ON VoiR DIRE
WILL TURN OUT TO BE IRRELEVANT AT TRIAL

Courts have occasionally upheld the refusal to allow voir dire questions
relating to a legal issue on the ground that the judge could not know until
the conclusion of the trial whether the issue would turn out to be relevant
at trial. For instance, the Tenth Circuit has upheld a lower court refusal to
allow the defendant to question prospective jurors regarding bias against the
defense of entrapment because "the trial judge could not know until the
case was concluded whether the evidence justified instructions on that issue. ' 7 2 The underlying concern is that the jury might speculate on matters
73
not in evidence.
Although a defendant may not be able to guarantee that a certain issue
will be developed at trial, the prejudice or confusion that would arise from
70. Id. at 1099.
71. A proper inquiry might be phrased as follows: "If the judge should instruct you that
it would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty on grounds of self-defense ifyou should
find (1)that the defendant was without fault in bringing on the confrontation and (2) that he
used deadly force because he reasonably believed that the use of such force was necessary to
protect himself from death or great bodily harm, would you for any reason be unwilling to
follow that instruction?"
A slightly more general inquiry might ask: "Do any of you feel that you would be unable
to follow the judge's instructions on self-defense because of your personal views on the subject?"
72. United States v. Crawford, 444 F.2d 1404, 1405 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
855 (1971). See also, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 468 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1972); State v.
Mhrtinez, 122 Ariz. 596, 596 P.2d 734 (1979); State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 255 A.2d 193
(1969); Oliver v. State, 85 Nev. 418, 456 P.2d 431, 434 (1969).
73. United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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an ultimately irrelevant issue being explored on voir dire will generally be
minimal. It is unlikely that a jury's verdict would be influenced by a voir
dire question on a defense such as entrapment when that defense is not
presented at trial, especially if, as suggested by the Federal Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia 7 4 a cautionary instruction is given explaining
the purposes of the voir dire examination and that the matters discussed
therein are not in evidence. The fact that a defense attorney is routinely
allowed to present his theory of the case to the jury in his opening statement
further suggests that the concern about the occasional irrelevant voir dire
question is unwarranted. 75 "If the issue is one on which jury attitudes should
be probed on voir dire to assure a fair trial by an impartial jury, this strength
of our system should not be scuttled merely because, on relatively infrequent
occasions, a planned defense is unexpectedly foreclosed or abandoned.' '76
The court should require no more than a good faith belief on the part of
the attorney that an issue to be explored on voir dire will be relevant at
77
trial.
Voir dire inquiries proposed by defendants have even been denied on the
grounds that the restrictions were for the defendants' own good. When a
defendant has been unable to state with certainty that he will eventually
testify, courts have refused to allow the defendant to question prospective
jurors concerning their willingness to follow instructions regarding the limited
purpose for which a defendant's prior convictions may be considered. 78 The
prohibition was deemed necessary to "protect" the defendant by preventing
jury speculation that he had a criminal record. 79 (A defendant's prior convictions are generally inadmissible except when he chooses to take the stand.) 80
However, defense counsel is presumably aware of the risk of jury speculation
and would not seek to ask questions concerning the defendant's prior convictions if it was not reasonably likely that the defendant was going to
testify. Strategic and tactical decisions which must be made both before and
during trial rest with the accused and his attorney, not with the trial judge."'

74. Id. at 380.
75. Id.
76. United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1973), quoted with approval
in United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 71 (9th Cir. 1977).
77. It is unethical for an attorney to allude in court to any matter that he does not
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence. MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONNL REsPoNsIBIUY DR 7-106 (c)(I)-(2) (1981). See also MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4 (1983).
78. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 122 Ariz. 596, 596 P.2d 734 (1979); State v. Manley, 54
N.J. 259, 255 A.2d 193 (1969).
79. State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 255 A.2d 193, 199 (1969).
80. United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207, 211 (1st Cir. 1978). See FED. R. Evm. 404(b),
609(a).
81. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976); cf. United States v. City of Philadelphia,
482 F. Supp. 1248, 1252-53 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1979), aff'd, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980) (court
notes counsel's responsibility, but grants remedy because error was court-induced). But see
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Defense counsel is certainly in a better position than the judge to predict

whether or not the defendant will testify. Therefore, a defendant's voir dire
examination should not be curtailed because the trial judge wishes to protect
the defendant from possible prejudice.
THE ARGUMENT THAT VoIR DIu ON RULES OF LAW
Is UNNECESSARY BECAUSE OF THE ASSUMPTION

THAT JURORS WILL FOLLOW THE LAW
The justification most frequently given for upholding a refusal to allow
a question concerning a specific rule of law is that the question was unnec2
essary either because the rule was covered in the judge's final jury instructions
or because the jurors previously indicated that they would abide by the
judge's instructions. 3 Underlying this justification is the assumption that
jurors will follow the law in deciding the case.84 A typical example of this
position is found in a 1978 decision of the Ninth Circuit rejecting the

Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1978), in which the Court held that the trial judge
did not unconstitutionally interfere with defense counsel's trial strategy by instructing the jury,
at the end of the trial and over the defendant's objections, that no adverse inference could be
drawn from the defendant's failure to testify. The tactical decision of whether to ask a voir
dire question is perhaps distinguishable from the one involved in Lakeside because, at the time
of the voir dire examination, the defendant's attorney is better able than the trial judge to
predict whether the defendant will ultimately take the stand (thus bringing his prior convictions
into issue). When the judge decided to give the instruction at issue in Lakeside, he was in as
good a position as defense counsel to decide whether the instruction was necessary to protect
the defendant's right.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356, 1366 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1068 (1979); United States v. Polk, 550 F.2d 1265, 1267 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 838 (1977); United States v. Flint, 534 F.2d 58 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924
(1976); United States v. Crawford, 444 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 855 (1971);
Roberson v. State, 384 So. 2d 864 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980); Collins v. State, 365 So. 2d 113
(Ala. Crim. App. 1978); Padgett v. State, 251 Ga. 503, 307 S.E.2d 480 (1983); Wallace v.
State, 248 Ga. 255, 282 S.E.2d 325 (1981); People v. Phillips, 99 Ill. App. 3d 362, 425 N.E.2d
1040, 1046 (1981); People v. Bradley, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1100, 424 N.E.2d 33 (1981); Manning
v. State, 630 P.2d 327 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981); Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 236 Pa. Super.
442, 398 A.2d 658 (1979); State v. Middleton, 266 S.C. 251, 222 S.E.2d 763, vacated on other
grounds, 429 U.S. 807 (1976).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Ledee, 549 F.2d 990 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902
(1977); United States v. Wooton, 518 F.2d 943 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 895 (1975);
United States v. Goodwin, 470 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969 (1973);
Padgett v. State, 251 Ga. 503, 307 S.E.2d 480 (1983); People v. Lowe, 30 Ill. App. 3d 49,
331 N.E.2d 639, 642 (1975); State v. Simms, 643 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); State v.
Knapp, 534 S.W.2d 465 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Oliver v. State, 85 Nev. 418, 456 P.2d 431
(1969); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 452 Pa. 130, 305 A.2d 5 (1973); Commonwealth v. Richmond, 462 A.2d 1362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Wooton, 518 F.2d 943 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
895 (1975); Cordero v. United States, 456 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1983); State v. Bitz, 93 Idaho 239,
460 P.2d 374 (1969); People v. Phillips, 99 Ill. App. 3d 362, 425 N.E.2d 1040 (1981); State v.
Middleton, 266 S.C. 251, 222 S.E.2d 763, vacated on other grounds, 429 U.S. 807 (1976).
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defendant's argument that the scope of his voir dire was improperly restricted:
Charles Mitchell requested the court on voir dire to instruct the jury on
the presumption of innocence and burden of proof and to ask them
whether they thought of such laws as being unfair. The trial court refused,
and this refusal is assigned as error. The trial court did ask the jurors
if they would follow his instructions as to the law. The jurors nodded
in affirmation. At the close of the evidence, the jury was fully instructed
as to the burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and the defendants' right to remain silent. The jurors were sworn to follow the
law. The scope of the voir dire is directed to the sound discretion of the
trial court, and it is assumed that a jury will, in accordance with the
oath they take, follow the judge's instructions."s
The assumption that jurors will follow the law appears to be based primarily on wishful thinking. While jurors do not have the right to disregard
the judge's instructions, they clearly have the power8 6 and are often willing
to use it.87 Commentators and courts have acknowledged that jurors are
often either unwilling or unable to follow specific rules of law relied on by
a criminal defendant.8 8 In fact, reversible error has been found in the refusal
to excuse such jurors for cause.8 9 Therefore, the fact that a legal principle

85. United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356, 1366 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1068 (1979).
86. Becker, supra note 48, at 41.
87. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-35 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
88. In H. KALVEN & H. ZIaSEL, TnE AMERIcAN JURY 395-410 (1966), the authors cite

examples in which juries apparently disregarded the law to the defendant's detriment with
respect to the defenses of entrapment, insanity, intoxication, and self-defense, and the requirement of proof of penetration in rape case.
In State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 269-70, 255 A.2d 193, 199 (1969), the court had this to
say with respect to the rule that a defendant's prior convictions could only be considered in
evaluating his credibility as a witness:
We recognize the almost unavoidable psychological impact on the layman-juror
of evidence of a defendant's conviction of similar crimes. It may be a lot to ask
of him that he put aside an almost common impulse to regard earlier proven
proclivity toward commission of similar crimes as some indication of guilt of the
offense presently charged against him.
In People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 411, 628 P.2d 869, 879, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317, 327 (1981),
the court stated the following with respect to the doctrine of self-defense:
[Tihere is a real possibility the average juror might disagree with the controversial
rule that a person may use force in self-defense even though an avenue of retreat
is open . . . . A juror who firmly believed that all passive means of self-defense
should be utilized before employing deadly force would find it difficult to judge
defendant's conduct objectively under our law.
The Supreme Court has recognized that a judge's instructions can only minimize, not prevent,
jury speculation about why a criminal defendant fails to testify. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S.
288, 303 (1981). And in United States v. Cockerham, 476 F.2d 542, 544 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
the court noted its agreement with the suggestion that some jurors may resist the insanity
defense.
89. See, e.g., State v. Byrd, 646 S.W.2d 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (veniremen's responses
tended to show a disregard of defendant's right not to testify); State v. Leonard, 296 N.C.

1984]

VOIR DIRE

is covered in the judge's instructions is not adequate to insure that the jury
will follow the law on that issue. As a California state appellate court
observed:
A court may charge a jury accurately respecting the law pertinent to the
case, yet it does not follow therefrom that the jury will accept the court's
statement of the law as correct and follow it in passing upon the issues
to be decided. Hence, to a party whose rights are to be committed to
the arbitrament of a jury, it is always of singular importance that he
should be convinced that those individuals who are to compose the jury
will be governed, in determining what their verdict shall be, not alone
by the evidence adduced before them, but also by the law which the
court may conceive is pertinent to the case and essential to an enlightened
consideration of the proofs.90
Nor is it adequate to insure a juror's impartiality to ask on voir dire
whether he can be fair and whether he will follow the judge's instructions.
Such general queries, which almost invariably invoke an affirmative response,91 fail to direct the venireman's attention to the specific issues which
are likely to be the subject of controversy. For instance, in State v. Simms, 92
the defendant sought to ask potential jurors if they would be able to follow
the judge's instruction limiting their consideration of the defendant's prior
convictions solely to the issue of his credibility as a witness. The Missouri
Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's refusal to allow this question on
the grounds that it was repetitious because the panel had previously been
asked if they could follow the judge's instructions. However, at the time
this preliminary question was asked, the veniremen were unaware that evidence of prior convictions would be introduced. Most, no doubt, were also
ignorant of the rule prohibiting them from considering those convictions as
substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt. Had the voir dire examination
focused on this specific rule of law, the defendant would have been able to

58, 248 S.E.2d 853 (1978) (three veniremen indicated they would not be willing to return a
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity); State v. Holden, 136 Vt. 158, 385 A.2d 1092
(1978); Martin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 436, 271 S.E.2d 123 (1980); Morgan v. People, 624
P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1981) (a juror repeatedly indicated he would have difficulty applying the
principle that the burden of proof rests solely upon the prosecution).
The decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in Morgan is ironic in that it is apparently
within the judge's discretion in Colorado to prohibit voir dire questions relating to the burden
of proof. People v. Strock, 42 Colo. App. 404, 600 P.2d 91 (1979), rev'd on other grounds,
623 P.2d 42 (Colo. 1981). Thus, a defendant in Colorado has a right to have a prospective
juror excused who is unwilling to follow the law on burden of proof, but it is within the
judge's discretion to prohibit the asking of the voir dire questions necessary to discover such
a bias.
90. People v. Bennett, 79 Cal. App. 76, 89-90, 249 P. 20, 25 (1926), quoted with approval
in Everly v. State, 395 N.E.2d 254, 256 (Ind. 1979).
91. Criminal defense attorney Charles Garry wrote that the typical judge's idea of voir
dire is to simply ask the prospective juror whether he can be fair, "even though Adolf Hitler
himself would have answered that question in the affirmative." Garry, Attacking Racism in
Court before Trial, in MINMIzIno RAcIsM IN JuRy TUALS xxii (A. Ginger ed. 1969).
92. 643 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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assess whether the veniremen were susceptible to "the inevitable pressure on
lay jurors to believe that 'if he did it before he probably did so this time.' -93
The veniremen could have stated much more accurately whether they were
willing and able to follow the judge's instructions.
A few courts have recognized the inadequacy of a general inquiry into a
venireman's willingness to follow the law. This viewpoint is cogently articulated by the California Supreme Court:
[I]n addition to the problem of subtle or unconscious bias that makes a
general proclamation of fairmindedness untrustworthy, here the ordinary
venireman has a very limited fund of knowledge from which to evaluate
the broadly phrased question. His answer may be true to the extent that
he is willing generally to act as the judge instructs him. But it is untenable
to conclude that the venireman's general declaration of willingness to
obey the judge is tantamount to an oath that he would not hesitate to
apply any conceivable instruction, no matter how repugnant to him.

Hence the answer is merely a predictable promise that cannot be expected
to reveal some substantial overtly held bias against particular doctrines.Y

A criminal defendant should not have to rely on a venireman's declaration
of his general willingness to follow the judge's instruction when an inquiry
focusing on the specific legal doctrines likely to be relevant at trial would
be much more effective in attaining the goal of an impartial jury.
THE CONCERN WITH EXPEDIENCY

The criticism most frequently leveled at the overall voir dire procedure is
that it is too time consuming.9 5 This concern has occasionally been expressed
by courts which refuse to allow voir dire questions on rules of law. 96 While
it is open to debate whether changes need to be effected in the general voir
dire procedures in order to promote judicial economy, 97 the interest in

93. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (opinion authored by
then Circuit Court Judge Warren Burger), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968).
94. People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 410, 628 P.2d 869, 878-79, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317,
326-27 (1981) (emphasis added and footnote omitted). See also United States v. Bear Runner,
502 F.2d 908, 912-13 (8th Cir. 1974); Fauna v. State, 265 Ark. 934, 582 S.W.2d 18 (1979);
People v. Thomas, 89 Ill.
App. 3d 592, 411 N.E.2d 1076, 1083 (1980).
95. State v. Pendry, 227 S.E.2d 210, 217 (W. Va. 1976); Gaba, supra note 41, at 532.
96. United States v. Wooton, 518 F.2d 943 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 895 (1975);
People v. Saiz, 660 P.2d 2 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Phillips, 99 Ill.
App. 3d 362, 425
N.E.2d 1040, 1045 (1981); State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 255 A.2d 193 (1969).
97. The extent to which lengthy voir dire examinations contribute to congested court
systems may be somewhat exaggerated. Craig, Erickson, Friesen & Maxwell, Voir Dire: Criticism
and Comment, 47 DEN. L.J. 465, 482 (1970); Note, Voir Dire: EstablishingMinimum Standards
to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1493, 1514 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards]. Most critics of the
time required for voir dire point to a few notorious trials in which the voir dire lasted days
or weeks. E.g., Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick, Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical Study, 44
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expediency cannot justify a blanket prohibition of questions directed to a
venireman's willingness to follow a specific rule of law. As noted by the
Seventh Circuit, "Expedition is clearly subsidiary to the duty to impanel an
impartial jury.'"'9 The jury selection process should not be streamlined at
99
the expense of questions reasonably designed to discover bias. Because a
juror who is unwilling to follow a pertinent rule of law is not impartial,
questions which most directly explore this type of bias'00 should not be
sacrificed in the interest of expediency.
It should be further noted that a question pertaining to a prospective
juror's acceptance of a specific legal principle can usually be asked and
answered in a relatively short amount of time.' 0' When the legal principle
at issue is particularly complex or controversial, counsel may seek to ask
additional questions to probe more deeply into each prospective juror's
attitude towards the rule of law. It is here that the judge can exercise his
discretion by deciding whether the additional expenditure of time is necessary
for the intelligent exercise of challenges. 0 2 But the minimal inquiry as to
the veniremen's willingness to follow the judge's instructions on a specific
rule of law has such little impact on the length of voir dire that it should
never be eliminated in the name of judicial economy.

S. CAL. L. REv. 916, 923 n.28 (1971); Note, Judge Conducted Voir Dire as a Time-Saving
Trial Technique, 2 Ru.-C.m. L.J. 161, 164 n.24 (1970). However, studies of the average time
spent on voir dire in various jurisdictions generally show an expenditure of only one, two, or
three hours. See Van Dyke, Voir Dire: How Should It Be Conducted to Ensure That Our
Juries Are Representative and Impartial?, 3 HASTiNGs CoNsT. L.Q. 65, 83-88 (1976).
98. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 370 n.42 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 970 (1973).
99. Various standards have been set forth attempting to strike a balance between the right
to an impartial jury and the desire for a time efficient selection process. It has been stated
that "all questions which would reasonably tend to bear on the possible prejudice of a juror
should be asked, but ... those questions should be asked as clearly, and with as little loss of
time, as possible." Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury
System, 26 F.R.D. 409, 467 (1960). The Eighth Circuit allows the judge to consider the need
for expediency in deciding how to conduct voir dire, while requiring that the procedure used
create "a reasonable assurance that prejudice could be discovered if present." United States
v. Cassel, 668 F.2d 969, 970-71 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1132 (1982) (citation omitted).
In People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317, 628 P.2d 869 (1981), the court
held that, although inordinately extensive and unfocused questioning should not be allowed, a
defendant has a right to ask questions reasonably designed to assist in the intelligent exercise
of peremptory or for cause challenges. Under any of these standards, a question as to a
venireman's willingness to apply a specific doctrine of law should be allowed.
100. Questions as to a venireman's willingness to follow a specific rule of law can be
effective at exposing bias. See infra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
101. See United States v. Cassel, 668 F.2d 969 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1132
(1982). Most attorneys are aware that a needlessly time-consuming voir dire examination can
antagonize the jury. Draheim, Efficient Jury Utilization Techniques . . .Or Proposition 12,
28 DRAKE L. REv. 21, 35 (1979).
102. See, e.g., Brundage v. United States, 365 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1966).
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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF VoIR DIRE QUESTIONS
ON RULES OF LAW
The discussion up to this point has assumed that attorneys can discover
biases against rules of law through voir dire questioning. This assumption
will now be explored. Some commentators are skeptical about the effectiveness of voir dire in unearthing prejudice generally, 013 and questions on
rules of law have been disallowed, in part, on this basis.'04 Certainly, the
less likely it is that such questions will expose the biases of prospective
jurors, the less justification there is for allowing the questions. 05 However,
as noted throughout this article, the detrimental effects arising from questions
relating to rules of law are generally minimal, both in terms of prejudice
to the parties and concerns of judicial economy. Therefore, a reasonable
probability of unearthing prejudice should be sufficient to justify the use of
such questions.
There have been relatively few attempts to scientifically evaluate the overall
effectiveness of voir dire in screening out biased jurors, and those studies
which have been conducted have failed to produce a consensus. In one
experiment, the first ballot votes of the actual jurors in criminal cases were
compared with the votes of peremptorily excused veniremen who remained
to deliberate as a "shadow jury."' 1 6 It was concluded that "there are cases
in which the jury verdict is seriously affected, if not determined, by the voir
dire."'°7
However, in an oft cited study by Professor Dale Broeder based on juror
interviews at the end of twenty-three trials in a federal district court, the
author concluded that, "[a]s an institution for sifting out'unfavorable' jurors, voir dire cannot be effective."' 0 8 This opinion was based on Broeder's
observations that the attorneys were unable to anticipate many factors in
the veniremen's backgrounds that would affect their evaluation of the case,
and that the jurors he interviewed had often been deceptive in responding
to the voir dire examination. ' 9
Professor Broeder's contention that voir dire examination is inherently
ineffective falls to take into account the manner in which the specific examinations he studied were conducted. Those examinations were character-

103. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations:An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. Rav. 503 (1965);
Gaba, supra note 41, at 532-33.
104. State v. Churchill, 6 4 P.2d 757, 761 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1983); State v. Kelly, 118
N.J. Super. 38, 285 A.2d 571, 579 (1972).
105. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 533 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Gaba,
supra note 41, at 536.
106. See Zeisel & Diamond, The Effects of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict:
An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STA. L. Rav. 419 (1978).
107. Id. at 518-19.
108. Broeder, supra note 103, at 505.
109. Id. at 505-06.
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ized as "perfunctory, stilted affairs"" 0 presided over by a judge hostile to
prolonged questioning in which legal rules precluded many questions relevant
to bias."' Furthermore, the voir dire was conducted by attorneys who,
overall, had a "feeling that one group of twelve was as likely to be as good
or as bad as another."" 2 Neither pertinent, probing questions, nor honest,
revealing answers are apt to arise from such circumstances." 3 Broeder's study
only suggests that a restricted and perfunctory voir dire will be ineffective
at exposing jury bias; it is not enlightening on the effects of a more extensive,
spirited inquiry.'

4

Although no studies have been found specifically investigating how often
prospective jurors'admit a bias against a rule of law in response to voir dire
questions requiring an individual response, other evidence exists suggesting
that such an inquiry dan be effective at exposing jury bias. It should first
be noted that many members of the public disagree with a number of
fundamental legal principles relied on by defendants. For example, the Supreme Court recently cited a national survey showing that 37% of the public
believes it is a defendant's responsibility to prove his innocence.' Other
studies also have cast doubt on the public's acceptance of a defendant's

110. Id. at 503.
111. Id. at 505.
112. Id. at 503-07.
113. There is a close relationship between the manner in which the voir dire examination
is conducted and the extent of venireman self-disclosure. See Suggs & Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure
in the Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245 (1981); Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards, supra note 97, at 1502-08; Note, Exploring Racial Prejudice on
Voir Dire: ConstitutionalRequirements and Policy Considerations,54 B.U.L. REv. 394, 398401 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Exploring Racial Prejudice]. A prospective juror might
not acknowledge a bias because he fails to recognize it within himself, because he might want
to be chosen to serve on the jury, or because he is too embarrassed to publicly admit a prejudice.
Note, Voir Dire: EstablishingMinimum Standards, supra note 97, at 1506 n.55. A voir dire
examination directed to the group with volunteered responses will elicit less information than
questions directed to the individual and requiring an individual response. Id. at 1523. Questions
will be more effective when they are detailed and open-ended, requiring more than a yes or
no response. Mitcham, Psychotherapy Techniques in Voir Dire Selection, 16 TRIAL, Sept. 1980,
at 52, 54; Note, Exploring Racial Prejudice, supra, at 398-401 (1974). For instance, consider
which question would be more enlightening about juror attitudes: "Would you give the defendant a fair trial?" or "How do you feel about the insanity defense?" Obviously, the voir
dire methods which will be most informative will also generally be more time consuming.
114. It is not at all clear from Broeder's study how often, if ever, jurors were personally
questioned about their willingness to follow specific doctrines of law. Broeder did report that
a number of jurors disregarded the rule that no adverse inference could be drawn from a
defendant's failure to testify, even though this point was discussed during voir dire. Broeder,
supra note 103, at 523. However, the only description of questioning on this subject was the
following: "Would anyone here draw a negative inference should my client fail to take the
stand?" Id. at 522. Such an inquiry, requiring only group silence to indicate a lack of bias,
would obviously not be as effective at revealing bias as would an inquiry requiring each
prospective juror to personally indicate whether he would have any reservations about following
the rule that no inference of guilt may be drawn from a failure to testify.
115. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 303 n.21 (1981), in which the Court referred to a
study conducted for the National Center for State Courts.
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presumption of innocence and his right not to testify." 6 Hostility toward
the insanity defense is also prevalent. A survey of over 1,000 prospective
jurors conducted in Colorado more than ten years prior to John Hinckley's

controversial insanity defense trial showed that 71% of those returning
questionnaires agreed that "the plea of insanity is a loophole allowing too

many guilty men to go free. ' "

7

As noted previously, jurors often find it

difficult to accept the principles of self-defense, entrapment, and the rule

limiting the jury's consideration of a defendant's prior convictions.'

s

Thus,

jury bias against the law poses a real threat to a criminal defendant's right
to have his case decided in accordance with applicable legal principles.
It should be clear that many attorneys believe voir dire questions relating
to legal issues can effectively expose bias because appellate courts are often
called upon to decide the propriety of such questions. In fact, a number of
judges and attorneys have recommended the use of such questions to discover
prejudice against the law. 1 9 Further, an examination of recent appellate

opinions reveals many instances in which prospective jurors, in response to
voir dire questioning, have indicated a reluctance to accept legal principles
relied on by a criminal defendant.

20

The frequency of these references

116. Over half of those participating in a nationwide random survey felt that a criminal
defendant should be required to take the stand and prove his innocence. Bush & Stuart, The
Future of Voir Dire in Minnesota: Fair Juries or False Expediency?, 38 BENCH & B. MINN.,
Dec. 1981, at 39, 43. See also supra note 58.

117.

Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-Qualified

Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. CoLo. L. Rav. 1, 6-8 (1970). More
recently, in a survey conducted by ABC News in June of 1982 in the wake of the Hinckley

trial, 79% of those questioned disapproved of laws which allow a criminal defendant to be
found not guilty because of insanity. Americans Evaluate the Court System, PUB. OPmNION,
Aug.-Sept. 1982, at 24, 27.
118. See supra note 88.
119. Werchick, Method, Not Madness: Selecting Today's Jury, 18 TRIAL, Dec. 1982, at
64, 67-68; Clarie, J., Remarks at the Annual Judicial Conference of the Second Judicial Circuit
of the United States (Sept. 10, 1982), 97 F.R.D. 556, 588-59; Cleary, Jury Selection in a Federal
Criminal Case (with form), 26 Pa,Ac. LAW., June 1, 1980, at 37; Fahringer, "In the Valley of

the Blind"--Jury Selection in a Criminal Case, 52 N.Y. ST. B.J. 197 (1980); Hannah, Voir Dire:
Its Value-How to Use It, 55 JUDICATURE, Oct. 1971, at 110.
120. Burden of proof and presumption of innocence: see, e.g., Morgan v. People, 624
P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1981); People v. Stone, 61 111. App. 3d 654, 378 N.E.2d 263 (1978); People
v. Lowe, 30 Il. App. 3d 49, 331 N.E.2d 639 (1975); State v. Shea, 421 So. 2d 200 (La. 1982);
State v. Nolan, 341 So. 2d 885 (La. 1977); State v. Thompson, 331 So. 2d 848 (La. 1976);
State v. Youngblood, 648 S.W.2d 182 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Homan v. State, 662 S.W.2d 372
(Tex. Crim. App. 1984); State v. Holden, 136 Vt. 158, 385 A.2d 1092 (1978); Martin v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 436, 271 S.E.2d 123 (1980); Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297,

227 S.E.2d 734 (1976); State v. Bennett, 304 S.E.2d 35 (W. Va. 1983).
Defendant's right to have no adverse inference drawn from his failure to testify: see, e.g.,
State v. Turrentine, 122 Ariz. 39, 592 P.2d 1305 (1979); State v. Glaze, 439 So. 2d 605 (La.
Ct. App. 1983); State v. Pennington, 642 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1982); State v. Byrd, 646 S.W.2d
419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Williams, 624 S.W.2d 127 (Mo.'Ct. App. 1981); State v.
Merritt, 589 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. App. 1979); State v. Ransburg, 540 S.W.2d 172 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976).
Insanity and intoxication defenses: see, e.g., Nobis v. State, 401 So. 2d 191 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1981); Godfrey v. Francis, 251 Ga. 652, 308 S.E.2d 806 (1983); Riggs v. State, 264 Ind.
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suggests that a significant number of jurors, if asked, are willing to acknowledge their disagreement with the law.' 2' This willingness might be
explained in part by the fact that it is more socially acceptable to publicly

acknowledge a disagreement with the law than a prejudice against a class
of people.
Thus, it appears that the voir dire examination can reveal jury bias against
rules of law. There is no compelling evidence that questions on matters of

law are so ineffective at exposing bias so as to warrant the conclusion that
they are not worth the time it takes to ask them. The fact that a defendant
may not be able to completely eliminate juror bias against the law does not
justify prohibiting reasonable efforts by him to do so. As stated by the
Supreme Court, "[n]o surer way could be devised to bring the processes of

justice into disrepute" than "to permit it to be thought that persons enterthat
taining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors and
1 22
inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disqualification were barred.'
INCONSISTENT RULINGS ON THE SCOPE OF VoIR DIRE

Appellate courts which have roundly condemned defense efforts to explore
veniremen attitudes towards applicable rules of law on voir dire have often
reacted more favorably to similar inquiries by the prosecution. These inconsistent decisions are often upheld on the basis of the trial judge's broad
discretion in conducting the voir dire.' 23 For instance, in 1981 the Missouri
Court of Appeals found that the trial judge properly overruled the defendant's objection to the prosecutor's voir dire question as to whether any
prospective juror would refuse to convict the defendant if the State failed
to produce an eyewitness.24 The court held that the inquiry was a legitimate

attempt to discover prejudice against the rule allowing circumstantial evidence

263, 342 N.E.2d 838 (1976); State v. McIntyre, 365 So. 2d 1348 (La. 1978); State v. Foster,
437 So. 2d 309 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Commonwealth v. Prendergast, 385 Mass. 625, 433 N.E.2d
438 (1982); State v. Rowe, 210 Neb. 419, 315 N.W.2d 250 (1982); State v. Leonard, 296 N.C.
58, 248 S.E.2d 853 (1978); State v. Johnson, 119 R.I. 749, 383 A.2d 1012 (1978).
Self-defense: see, e.g., People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal. Rptr.
317 (1981); Todd v. State, 143 Ga. App. 619, 239 S.E.2d 188 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
921 (1978); State v. Sylvester, 400 So. 2d 640 (La. 1981); State v. Eaker, 380 So. 2d 19 (La.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847 (1980).
121. Obviously, the fact that one or more jurors indicated their disagreement with a legal
principle during voir dire will many times go unmentioned in an appellate court opinion.
122. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 315 (1931).
123. The broad discretion of the trial judge in conducting voir dire is recognized in virtually
every jurisdiction. Ryan & Neeson, Voir Dire: A Trial Technique in Transition, 4 AM. J.TRiAL
ADvoC. 523, 526 (1981). Appellate opinions will often express disapproval of voir dire questions
relating to rules of law and then hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
prohibiting such questions. See, e.g., United States v. Wooton, 518 F.2d 943 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 895 (1975); State v. Melendez, 121 Ariz. 1, 588 P.2d 294 (1978); Jacobs v.
State, 358 A.2d 725 (Del. 1976); Padgett v. State, 251 Ga. 503, 307 S.E.2d 480 (1983).
124. State v. Reed, 629 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
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to support a conviction. 2 5 The same court, the very next year, found no
abuse of discretion in the trial judge's refusal to allow the defendant to
question prospective jurors about their willingness to follow the rule limiting
their consideration of the defendant's prior convictions to the issue of his
credibility as a witness. 26 Missouri courts have also found no abuse of
discretion in permitting the prosecution to ask if prospective jurors had any
quarrel with the law of felony-murder and the rule holding a defendant
criminally responsible for the acts of an accomplice.2 27 Yet the Missouri
Court of Appeals ruled in another first degree murder case that the defendant
had no right to inquire whether the veniremen were willing to follow the
judge's instruction requiring the prosecution to prove that the defendant
28
acted with premeditation and deliberation.
Similarly, in separate cases involving the insanity defense and the defense
of acting to protect another, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held
that the defendants' proposed voir dire questions were improper because
they regarded legal issues which would be covered in the judge's instructions. 29 Yet, in the time interval between those two decisions, the same court
held in a rape case that it was a legitimate inquiry for the prosecutor to ask
the veniremen if they thought it would ever be proper for a stepfather to
"educate" his daughter by having intercourse with her, even though the
judge's jury charge undoubtedly discussed whether intercourse with one's
stepdaughter would ever be permitted under the law. 30 It is not difficult to
find other examples of seemingly contradictory holdings in which the only
factual distinction appears to be whether it was the prosecution or the
3
defendant seeking the voir dire inquiry.' '

125.

Id. at 427.

126. State v. Simms, 643 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
127. State v. Thompson, 610 S.W.2d 629 (Mo. 1981).
128. State v. Knapp, 534 S.W.2d 465 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
129. Nauni v. State, 670 P.2d 126 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); Palmer v. State, 532 P.2d 85
(Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
130. Hancock v. State, 664 P.2d 1039 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
131. Third Circuit: Compare United States v. Wooton, 518 F.2d 943 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 895 (1975) (defendant not permitted to question veniremen on willingness to follow
law on insanity defense and burden of proof) with United States v. Todaro, 448 F.2d 64 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1040 (1972) (court asked veniremen if they would follow
instruction that defendant can be guilty of attempted extortion even if no money changed
hands).
Alabama: Compare Watwood v. State, 389 So. 2d 549 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (prosecution
permitted to ask veniremen if they would be unwilling to convict if its case depended on the
testimony of only one eyewitness) and Jackson v. State, 56 Ala. App. 94, 319 So. 2d 290
(1975) (prosecution allowed to inquire about juror willingness to convict if case relied on
circumstantial evidence) with Fletcher v. State, 291 Ala. 67, 277 So. 2d 882 (1973) and Ward
v. State, 44 Ala. App. 229, 206 So. 2d 897, 917-20 (1966) (both courts denied defendant the
opportunity to explore juror attitudes toward the insanity defense).
Arizona: Compare State v. Baumann, 125 Ariz. 404, 610 P.2d 38 (1980) (allowed inquiries
by the trial court into the prospective jurors' ability to judge testimony of state witness testifying
pursuant to a plea bargain) and State v. Bullock, 26 Ariz. App. 149, 546 P.2d 1158 (1976)

1984]

VOIR DIRE

The most notable example of the prosecution being allowed to ask voir

dire questions relating to legal issues is the common practice in capital cases
of "death-qualifying" the jury. This process involves asking veniremen if
they have beliefs which would prevent them from ever imposing a death

sentence. 3 2 There seems little basis for allowing such an inquiry while refusing
to allow defendants to explore juror attitudes toward other legal issues. The

death qualification questioning can be quite time consuming, *it addresses
legal issues which are eventually covered in the judge's instructions, and it
has the same potential for indoctrination as any other voir dire inquiry into
legal matters. In Commonwealth v. Fisher,33 the defendant argued that,
because the state had the right to death-qualify a jury, he should be entitled
to question prospective jurors on their willingness to apply the law of self-

defense. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's only justification for rejecting
this analogy was that public opposition to the law of self-defense was not
as widespread as opposition to capital punishment. 3 4 However, just because
opposition is not widespread does not mean it is nonexistent. Even one

(allowed. inquiries by the trial court regarding the prospective jurors' agreement with the
proposition that the presumption of innocence gives way in the face of evidence to the contrary)
with State v. Melendez, 121 Ariz. 1, 588 P.2d 294 (f978) (upheld trial court's refusal to pose
voir dire questions relating to accomplice testimony and defendant's prior felony convictions).
Georgia: Compare Smith v. State, 238 Ga. 146, 231 S.E.2d 757 (1977) and Head v. State,
160 Ga. App. 4, 285 S.E.2d 735 (1981) (both cases held that the defense was not entitled to
ask whether the jury would follow the trial court's instructions) with Morris v. State, 228 Ga.
39, 184 S.E.2d 82 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1050 (1972) (prosecution's voir dire questions
relating to adherence to law held proper) and Clark v. Grimes, 223 Ga. 461, 156 S.E.2d 91
(1967) (prosecution's voir dire questions concerning prospective jurors' conscientious objections
to capital punishment held proper).
Illinois: Compare People v. Davis, 95 Ill. 2d 1, 447 N.E.2d 353, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
507 (1983), reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct 1017 (1984) (prosecution permitted to ask veniremen if they
would follow state laws on circumstantial evidence and allowing the defendant to be found
guilty of murder even though an accomplice pulled the trigger) and People v. Freeman, 60 Ill.
App. 3d 794, 377 N.E.2d 107 (1978), aff'd, 79 Ill. 2d 147, 402 N.E.2d 157 (1979) (allowed
prosecution's voir dire inquiries relating to whether prospective jurors would be prejudiced
against following Illinois law permitting a conviction to be based on circumstantial evidence)
with People v. Freeman, 60 Ill. App. 3d 794, 377 N.E.2d 33 (1981) (defense denied inquiry'
into jurors' willingness to follow law with respect to self-defense) and People v. Newlun, 89
Ill. App. 3d 938, 412 N.E.2d 1055 (1980) (defense not allowed to inquire of prospective jurors
whether defendant's refusal to testify would prejudice the presumption of innocence).
132. See generally Colussi, The Unconstitutionality of Death Qualifying a Jury Prior to
the Determination of Guilt: The FairCross-SectionRequirement in CapitalCases, 15 CREIIHrON
L. REv. 595 (1982).
133. 447 Pa. 405, 290 A.2d 262 (1972).
134. Id. at 408-09, 290 A.2d at 264-65. Pennsylvania appellate courts have also upheld
trial court refusals to allow defendants to question prospective jurors about their willingness
to follow the law with respect to the insanity defense. Commonwealth v. Biebighauser, 450
Pa. 336, 300 A.2d 70 (1973); Commonwealth v. Geschwendt, 271 Pa. Super. 102, 412 A.2d
595 (1979), aff'd, 500 Pa. 120, 454 A.2d 991 (1982). This doctrine may well be more controversial
than the death penalty. In a national opinion poll conducted in 1981, only 25% of those
questioned stated that they were opposed to the death penalty for persons convicted of murder.
Tit GALIUP REPORT, April 1981, at 18. Compare this figure with the results of polls examining
attitudes towards the insanity defense discussed supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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undetected juror unwilling to abide by a rule of law can affect a jury's
verdict.
Current case law creates the unmistakable impression that the prosecution's
interest in securing a jury willing to follow the legal principles necessary to
its case is more highly valued than the defendant's corresponding interest
in seating jurors willing to adhere to the legal principles upon which he
relies. This state of affairs is incompatible with the principle that an individual is not to be deprived of his liberty except by due process of law, and
cannot be justified by a blind deference to the trial judge's discretion.
Appellate courts must be willing to review lower court rulings in a consistent
and principled fashion, even if it means occasionally ordering a new trial
when a defendant's voir dire inquiry has been improperly restricted.
A

PROPOSED STANDARD

No one questions the trial judge's power to forbid voir dire inquires which
are misleading, argumentative, or unreasonably lengthy. At the same time,
inquiries into the prospective jurors' willingness to follow specific rules of
law relied on by a criminal defendant are a legitimate and essential part of
the voir dire examination. a5 Once it is recognized that there is no justification
for a blanket prohibition of such questions, the difficult task remains of
formulating a standard which strikes a proper balance between the defendant's right to probe for bias against the law and the need for judicial control
over the examination.
One approach is to create a per se right to a minimum voir dire inquiry.
The defendant would be entitled, upon request, to have the following question asked with respect to any relevant legal rule:
If the judge instructed you that . . . [set forth the rule], is there any
reason why you would be unwilling or unable to follow that instruction?
This minimal inquiry could be directed to the veniremen as a group, but
individual responses should be required in order to encourage disclosure.
Under this approach, it would still be within the judge's discretion to decide
36
the exact wording of questions, including how the rule of law is defined.
If the defendant feels that the legal principle at issue is particularly complex
or controversial, he may wish to probe more deeply for jury bias by having
more detailed, open-ended questions directed to each individual venireman.

135. Whether it is proper for the prosecution to make voir dire inquiries with respect to
rules of law on which it will rely depends on how one views the controversy over jury
nullification. Proponents of jury nullification would allow jurors to acquit, but not convict, a
criminal defendant by disregarding relevant rules of law. See Christie, supra note 49, at 1299.
136. For instance, if the veniremen had been questioned on their willingness to follow the
judge's instructions on self-defense, the judge would have to decide whether to allow an
additional inquiry focusing on that portion of the self-defense doctrine which allows a person
to use force to defend himself even though an avenue of retreat is open.

1984]

VOIR DIRE

Again, the judge would decide whether to allow the additional inquiry. These
decisions as to the scope of the voir dire would be subject to appellate
review, with an abuse of discretion being found if the procedure used failed
to create a reasonable assurance that prejudice, if present, could be discovered.
This proposed per se rule has the advantage of insuring that a defendant
will be able to obtain a jury at least verbally committed to following each
relevant rule of law. This procedure could usually be conducted in a relatively
short amount of time. The judge would maintain his discretion to prohibit
improper or inordinately extensive questioning and, when necessary, to expand the inquiry beyond that minimally required.
One of the dangers involved in establishing a per se rule, however, is the
possibility that trial and appellate judges will take the attitude that the right
to inquire into jury bias against the law begins and ends with the minimally
required procedure. Therefore, any appellate decision or legislative action
establishing a per se rule should make it clear that there will be cases in
which the failure to allow an inquiry beyond that minimally required would
constitute reversible error.
Another approach is to determine the necessity of an inquiry by assessing
the likelihood that the inquiry would expose bias. For instance, the California
Supreme Court recently held in People v. Williams 37 that a reasonable inquiry
should be permitted into a potential juror's willingness to apply any legal
doctrine which was likely to be relevant at trial. The court went on to state,
however, that reversal would be required only if the doctrine actually turned
out to be relevant and only if "the excluded question is found substantially
likely to expose strong attitudes antithetical to defendant's cause."' 38 The
cutting off argumentrial court's discretion to control the examination by
39
tative or overly lengthy questioning was left intact.
The minimal inquiry concerning the jurors' willingness to follow a specific
rule of law will generally take little time and create no prejudice to the
parties. It is therefore preferable to allow this basic inquiry without requiring
a showing that the question is likely to expose bias. However, if California
courts are not reluctant to find that a question is "substantially likely" to
expose bias,140 the rule announced in Williams would have much the same
effect as a per se rule. Under either approach, appellate review of lower
court rulings on the scope of voir dire will frequently have to be done on

137. 29 Cal. 3d 392, 628 P.2d 869, 174 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1981).
138. Id. at 410, 628 P.2d at 879.
139. Id. at 408, 628 P.2d at 877.
140. In Williams the court held that a question concerning the rule allowing a defendant
to use force to defend himself without retreating was substantially likely to uncover jury bias
so that its exclusion required a new trial. At present, there are no subsequent California opinions
which have applied the "substantial likelihood" test to a proposed voir dire question relating
to a rule of law. Perhaps California trial courts are now routinely allowing such inquiries.
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a case-by-case basis under the guidance of a rather vague standard. Because
the proper scope of a voir dire examination will necessarily be determined
more through the exercise of judicial discretion rather than by the application
of precise rules, the particular standard applied may be less important than
the courts' recognition of the legitimacy of voir dire questions relating to
rules of law.
CONCLUSION

Jury antipathy towards a rule of law, like racial hostility or exposure to
pretrial publicity, can compromise a criminal defendant's right to have his
case decided by an impartial jury. Voir dire questions relating to rules of
law are not inherently improper, and any attempted abuses of the voir dire
process can easily be controlled by the trial judge. An inquiry probing
veniremen attitudes toward specific legal principles will be much more effective at exposing bias than an inquiry directed to the prospective jurors'
general willingness to abide by the judge's instructions. The interest in
expediency cannot take priority over the duty to impanel an impartial jury.
In any event, an inquiry into venireman willingness to abide by specific rules
of law can usually be accomplished expeditiously. If trial and appellate
courts recognize these principles, judicial discretion to control the scope of
the voir dire examination can be exercised in a sound manner.

